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Conflict and the Need for a Theory of Proxy Warfare
Abstract
Modern conflict is dominated by proxy wars but the United States military fails to account
for this type of environment. Instead, it speaks euphemistically by using phrases like, By,
With, and Through to articulate the complexities of proxy environments. In doing so, it falls
short in understanding the dynamics at work between actors in a proxy relationship, which
has resulted in it doing poorly in modern proxy wars. Therefore, the United States military
should embrace proxy warfare from a theoretical standpoint and develop a resultant proxy
warfare doctrine. Proxy environments - dominated by principal-agent problems, the
oppression of time, and power dynamics between actors - are often paradoxical, but yield
two distinct models, one that is exploitative and the other being transactional. Breathing
life into these theories of proxy warfare adds to the professional body of knowledge and
will assist political and military leaders and advisers in proxy environments.
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Introduction
Environments in which powers pursue its interests through surrogates
dominate contemporary conflict. To be sure, the United States’ wars in the
Middle East, The Philippines, and Africa through the 21st century
illustrate this point. However, the idea of war-through-surrogate is not
exclusive to the United States. Russia’s use of intermediaries in eastern
Ukraine is a high-profile example of this concept in action. Delving beyond
the surface, the student of war and international relations finds Iranian
proxies interwoven in almost every political and military movement in the
Middle East.
That is not to say conventional conflict is over, or to argue that proxy wars
are fundamentally guerrilla-driven insurgencies. To be sure, the
conventional character and destruction of the campaigns to defeat the
Islamic State, highlighted by the leveling of cities like Ramadi and Mosul
in Iraq, Raqqa, and Aleppo in Syria, or Marawi in the Philippines,
demonstrates that land armies are willing and able to stand and fight to
further their military and political ends. Shifting to Ukraine’s Donets River
Basin, one finds Russian proxies and regular forces meeting in battle in
ways similar to those found in the Second World War.
Understanding that proxy war is not unique to one method of warfighting,
but instead possess its own nuance, it is instructive to note that the United
States lacks a coherent theory of war or related doctrine to support proxy
war. The United States Army, the service charged with leading the
Department of Defense’s land wars, is all but absent any mention of proxy
wars, proxies, or the use of intermediaries.1 Further, the American joint
doctrine fails account for proxy war, as noted by the absence of any
reference to proxy environments, proxy wars, or proxy forces within Joint
Publication 3-0, Operations.2 This is problematic given the dominance of
proxy wars in contemporary conflict.
The United States Department of Defense sidesteps proxy reality and
repackages the concept of operating through intermediaries in an idea
known as by, with, and through and security force assistance. In addition
to publishing a new security force assistance manual, United States Army
General Joseph Votel, and United States Army Colonel Eero Keravuori,
recently advocated that by, with, and through approach is the solution to
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operating in environments in which the United States operates through
surrogates.3
Votel and Keravuori posit that United States Central Command’s ‘by, with,
and through’ technique is useful in pursuing American interesting in
Central Command’s area of responsibility and as a result, “The U.S.
military must organize, resource, and train the joint force to operate by,
with, and through with greater efficiency and effectiveness with various
types of partners and whole-of-government involvement.”4 Further, they
contend that the ‘by, with, and through’ approach will become increasingly
useful on a global scale. Therefore, they recommend the adoption of a ‘by,
with, and through’ approach as the standing operational approach and
that the joint force develop an associated doctrine to support of this
concept.5
Votel and Keravuori’s argument is useful is starting the discussion
environments in which a dominate partner works through an
intermediary. It is useful because it reflects current narratives regarding
proxy environments. Nevertheless, several problems exist with Votel and
Keravuori’s advocacy for the ‘by, with, and through’ approach. First, they
provide a solution without defining the problem they are attempting to
solve. If one can make their way through euphemism of phrases like ‘by,
with, and through’ and security force assistance, they will see that the
problem is that of proxy environments, or environments in which one
actor works with or through another actor to achieve its self-interest or
national security objectives.
Second, they suggest that the character of ‘by, with, and through’ is
universal and should, therefore, serve as the foundation for a joint force
doctrine when operating through intermediaries. Specifically, Votel and
Keravuori state that, “To capitalize on this approach, the joint force must
deliberately engage in developing doctrine for partnering, resourcing,
organizing, educating, training, and transitioning in a ‘by, with, and
through’ operational approach.”6 The problem with this argument is that it
fails to address the uniqueness of proxy environments it relates to the
relationship between partners. The argument also falls short because
proxy environments have discrete nuance and therefore are not
universally transferable. To be sure, Central Command’s proxy situation is
not the same as those found in other theaters. U.S. European Command,
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U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command are addressing
proxy conflicts that are distinct from those facing U.S. Central Command.
As a result, a Central Command-specific approach, such as by, with, and
through, are illogical. Further, operating through intermediaries is not
unique to the American perspective, and an approach that focuses on
American predilections at the expense of proxy truths, is short-sided and
results in environment blind spots.
Third, the ‘by, with, and through’ approach has not provided tangible
victory beyond the tactical level. While the United States and the Iraqi
Security Forces were able to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq physically,
strategic and political victory slipped away during the summer of 2018.
Furthermore, none of the United States military’s recent or on-going proxy
conflicts, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring
Freedom, has concluded on terms favorable to the United States.
The thrust of this work is to clarify the problems found within Votel and
Keravuori’s argument. In doing so, this essay looks to push beyond
euphemistic and misleading phraseology and instead speak plainly about
proxy warfare. When framing the proxy conflict, the illumination of three
distinct features is apparent. The first feature that dominates proxy
conflicts is that of principal-agent problems. Second is the role of power in
proxy relationships. The third and final feature is the dominant role of
time in proxy conflict. These features drive two distinct models of proxy
environments – a transactional and exploitative model. This essay then
concludes by providing a set of principles, deduced from the
aforementioned analysis, to set the foundation for a general theory of
proxy warfare. This general theory of proxy warfare should serve as the
basis for a proxy warfare doctrine.

A Deeper Examination of the Problems with the By, With, and
Through Approach
The first problem with the ‘by, with, and through’ approach articulated by
Votel and Keravouri is that it is a solution looking for a problem. The
closest Votel and Keravouri come to stating a problem is in suggesting
that, “Regional conflicts can arise when...actors do not have the capacity
and resources to resolve their conflicts locally, potentially putting U.S.
interests in the region at risk.”7 This statement, and the remainder of their
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argument, provides almost no context to support their argument for why
the BWT approach. This begs the question, what is the problem Central
Command is attempting to solve?
The military problems plaguing Central Command are manifold. From
countering the Islamic State across the area of responsibility to keeping
the Taliban at bay in Afghanistan, the problems span the geographic
expanse of the area of responsibility. The United States Government and
Department of Defense, in most cases, have resolved to face those
challenges through a limited liability approach, meaning that instead of
putting United States military personnel at the front of these fights, they
elect to operate through proxies. In addition, this—proxy environments
and proxy warfare—is the problem not articulated in Votel and Keravuori’s
argument. While course and distasteful, it is worth being forthright about
those concepts because they dominate contemporary war and are at the
heart of what ‘by, with, and through’ attempts to address.
American strategic theorist, Everett Dolman, contends that if one only
communicates in the language of the system they inextricably bound by
that system’s rules.8 In the case of the United States military, being
unwilling to speak openly about proxy environments and proxy warfare,
and instead speaking through its approved euphemisms, has created a
situation in which the United States military has no unifying theory or
doctrine for the environment in which it most often finds itself. Similarly,
a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in
which they state that, “The United States lacks a common governmentwide policy or doctrinal definition for characterizing different security
partnerships in implementing a “by, with, and through” approach.”9 But
again, the manner in which the United States military speaks about proxy
warfare, using phrases such as security force assistance, working through
partners, and working by, with, and through, is good for softening the
coarseness of proxy warfare’s reality, but it does little to illuminate the
concept.
Additionally, the ‘by, with, and through’ approach fails to advance a warwinning technique. While definitions of victory are dubious, British
military theorist, B. H. Liddell Hart offers that, “The object in war is to
attain a better peace—even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is
essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”10
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Prussian general and military theorist Colmar von der Goltz reinforces this
position in writing that, “After shattering the hostile main army, we,
therefore, still have the coercion of a peace as a special, and, under certain
more circumstances, more difficult, task to consider, the solution of which
should, however, have been carefully weighed before deciding upon war.”11
Goltz reminds the practitioner of war that tactical victory, such as
Operation Inherent Resolve’s battle of Mosul, are hollow victories if we fail
to secure the peace or if we fail to link the those tactical victories to the
maintenance of our strategic objectives. Moreover, in the case of proxy
environments, the pursuit of one’s strategic ends has to be sensitive and
responsive to both oneself, and to the proxy force’s government, especially
in transactional relationships.
To be sure, the Votel and Kervouri provide ample tactical examples that
illustrate the utility of the ‘by, with, and through’ approach allowing the
United States military to operate through and alongside proxies, but to
date, the concept has failed to deliver tangible victory—a better peace—at
the operational or strategic level.12 Of its recent proxy campaigns,
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq, have
terminated; however, strategic victory slipped away following each
operation due to the inability to effective manipulate the proxy
environment.

Defining the Shape of Proxy Environments and Proxy
Relationships
If one accepts that ‘by, with, and through’ is just a euphemism for proxy
warfare, which forms the basis of this essay’s argument, then it naturally
follows that proxy environments must be explained in detail. In order to
comprehend proxy environments, it is imperative to understand that
Central Command’s version of proxy warfare is not universal, nor is proxy
warfare something uniquely American. Therefore, it follows that proxy
warfare is:
a) A form of warfare that possesses nuance
b) That its nuance is relative to the geographic theater
c) That its nuance is relative to the principal force in the proxy
relationship
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d) That its nuance is relative to the proxy, or agent, in the proxy
relationship.13
Before moving on it is important to highlight a few other points and to
offer a definition of proxy environments and proxy warfare. First, varying
degrees of proxy warfare exist.14 This is a valid argument; however, as will
be described later, this can be better understood with two models of proxy
warfare. Second, proxy warfare and coalition warfare share similar
characteristics, if not overlap a bit, especially as one moves away from the
exploitative end of the proxy warfare spectrum. This is where a definition
for the concepts becomes useful.
For the purpose of this essay, a proxy environment is defined as an
environment characterized by two or more actors working towards a
common objective; the relationship between the two actors is hierarchical
and the principal actor is working by, with, and through another actor (an
agent, or proxy) to accomplish its objective. By default, the principal’s
objective becomes the agent’s objective. Proxy warfare, on the other hand,
is the associated theory of action for proxy environments. Proxy warfare is
the physical manifestation of a dominant actor, or the principal, operating
by, with, and through a non-dominant actor (the agent, or proxy) against
an adversary to achieve the dominant actors’ military objectives.
Relationships between parties are either tight or loosely-coupled. The
relationship’s tight or loose-coupling results from its environmental and
internal conditions. A tight-coupled relationship is one in which both
parties have many variables in common or the variables they have in
common are strong. In tight-coupled relationships bond between actors is
strong and the non-dominant actor is highly responsive to the dominant
actor. Conversely, in loose-coupled relationships the bond is weak because
either the actors have few variables in common or those that are in
common and are weakly aligned.15 A quick scan of a few current proxy
environment demonstrates this supposition.16
Russia has long been one of the leaders of proxy warfare. British military
historian John Keegan notes that the Romanov dynasty, which ruled
Russia from the seventeenth century until the Russian Revolution of 1917,
recurrently solicited the Cossacks to serve as its proxy and to augment its
own combat power.17 Similarly, Russia dominates modern proxy hotspots
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by achieving access and influence with pliable local nationals, mercenaries,
and foreign nationals sympathetic to its cause. Various forms of Russian
proxies exist throughout Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, but two
of the most interesting examples of Russian proxies endure in the ongoing
conflicts in Ukraine’s Donets Basin and in Syria.18
In Ukraine’s Donets Basin, Russian proxies have been doing Russian
bidding since the spring of 2014. The proxies, manifest as Russian-aligned
Ukrainian separatists, carved out a foothold in eastern Ukraine, and have
maintained quasi-independence from the government in Kyiv courtesy of
Moscow’s support. While direct Russian military involvement in the
conflict is well known, recent reports suggest that Russian generals are at
the top of its proxy army.19 Along the way, Russian forces, both proxy and
its own military, have killed over 10,000 Ukrainians in the Donets Basin
and wounded an additional 24,000.20
In Syria, Russia has a friend in President Bashar Al-Assad. Russia, to
bolster Assad, leverages Syrian proxies, private military companies, and
Chechen client forces, in coordination with its own armed forces. Further,
Russia practices strategic and operational ju-jitsu by using the Syrian civil
war and the mission to defeat the Islamic State in the Levant against the
involved parties, while offering to mediate the chaos they create. General
Votel has spoken about Russia’s approach, stating that in Syria and the
Central Command area of responsibility, Russia plays both the arsonist
and the fireman.21
As mentioned previously, the U.S. military makes frequent use of proxy
forces. See Table 1. Operation Inherent Resolve is perhaps the most
obvious example of American proxy warfare in which United States forces,
in conjunction with coalition members, fought through Iraqi and Kurdish
intermediaries to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq militarily. Currently,
United States forces are still working to do the same in Syria, albeit with a
different proxy force.
Operation Inherent Resolve is not the only example of American forces
engaged in proxy environments. The United States employed proxies to
defeat the Islamic State in The Philippines militarily, as the battle of
Marawi illustrates.22 In Saudi Arabia, American forces are working
through proxies to assisting the Saudis against the Houthi rebels.23
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Afghanistan, the United States Army’s longest running proxy hotspot, has
seen both direct combat and war through proxy since 2001. Most recently,
the United States Army deployed its first security forces assistance brigade
to spearhead its proxy war against the Taliban and other enemies in the
region. Meanwhile, in Africa, the United States reportedly has over 5,000
soldiers leveraging local proxies to counter Islamic State expansion on the
continent.24
Table 1: Known United States Proxy Wars, 2001-Present
Principal
Proxy
Conflict
Theater
Date
United
Afghan
Operation
Afghanistan
October
States
Defense
Enduring
2001Forces
Freedom /
present
Resolute
Support
United
Iraqi
Operation
Iraq
March
States
Security
Iraqi
2003Forces
Freedom /
December
New Dawn
2011
United
Iraqi
Operation
Iraq
October
States
Security
Inherent
2014-May
Forces
Resolve
2018
United
Syrian
Operation
Syria
October
States
Democratic
Inherent
2014Forces
Resolve
present
United
Filipino
CounterThe
Fall 2016States
Defense
Islamic
Philippines
present
Forces
State
Campaign
United
Saudi
Operation
Saudi Arabia, UnknownStates
Arabian
Yukon
Yemen
present
Defense
Journey
Forces
United
Multiple
Counter
Africa
UnknownStates
African
Islamic
present
defense
State
forces
Campaign
Note: The researcher reviewed all data listed in this table. All sources are
found in the footnotes and come from open-source information sources.
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Source: Author.
Given the diversity of proxy environments, developing a general theory of
proxy environments logically follows. This theory must then form the basis
for a doctrine for proxy warfare. Both the theory of proxy environments
and doctrine of proxy warfare must be rooted current and historic
examples, such as those from the preceding paragraphs. Further, the
theory and doctrine cannot gravitate around an American-centric point of
view, but rather, from a position that explains the uncolored character of
each.
With that in mind and given the cursory discussion on proxy
environments in the previous paragraphs, a handful of axioms on proxy
environments illuminate themselves. At the most rudimentary level, the
following tenets bound proxy environments:
● All proxy environments are driven by political interest; this
forms the basis for military partnership and aligned military
objectives;
● Proxy environments are based on a relationship between a
principal and a proxy, or agent;
● Proxy relationships are transactional or exploitative;
● Proxy relationships, being either transaction or exploitative,
have a limited duration;
● Not all political, strategic, and operational decisions come with a
noticeable or overt change at the tactical level;
● Battles won accelerates divergence, while battles lost weaken the
principal-agent relationship;
● Proxy hot spots are not unique to one type of warfare, but exist
anywhere along the war’s continuum;
● The base of power within a proxy (principal-agent) relationship
can shift if:
o The proxy grows strong enough stand on its own,
o The proxy gains or mobilizes power from actors that are
not the principal partner,
o The proxy accomplished the goals that brought it in line
with the principal
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These axioms, or bookends to proxy environments, provide a point of
departure in which to extrapolate a theory of proxy environments further.

Expanding Existing Models: The Components of Proxy
Environments
British historian, theorist, and soldier, J.F.C. Fuller offers astute advice in
the argument for rigor in developing doctrine. Fuller posits that, “Method
creates doctrine, and a common doctrine is the cement which holds an
army together. Though mud is better than no cement, we want the best
cement, and we shall never get it unless we can analyze war scientifically
and discover its values.”25 With that point in mind, the following section
seeks to develop the ‘science,’ or theoretical underpinning, that Fuller
suggests is so important to developing a solid doctrine. This section, which
builds upon the previous noted axioms, seeks to build a general theory of
proxy environments through exposing the components of proxy
environments—the impact of time, fallacy of limited liability, and the
principal-agent problem.
Time: The Governing Condition of War
Given proxy warfare’s character, driven by shifting political winds; it is fair
to argue that a running clock dominates proxy environments. American
military theorist, Robert Leonhard, argues that the inability to manipulate
time effectively, above all else, is what most plagues commanders.26 More
to the point, Leonhard asserts that, “Military conflict—whether in wars,
campaigns, or battles—seeks to summon that failure (or delay it) and is
therefore, when reduced to its fundamentals, a contest for time.”27 Perhaps
more appropriately, J.F.C. Fuller contends that, “Superiority of time is so
important a factor in war that it frequently becomes the governing
condition.”28 Time, being a salient component of proxy warfare, warrants
further analysis.
Time operates at varying rates across the levels of war, as well as across
the social and political spectrum. Furthermore, time varies based upon a
society’s level of involvement in a specified conflict. For instance, the Iraqi
social and political clock, as it related to the defeat of the Islamic State,
moved much quicker than did the social and political clock in the United
States. As a result, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi was quick to declare victory
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over the Islamic State and shifted his messaging to U.S. troop reductions
following his pronouncement of victory in December 2017.29
Further, social, and political clocks operate quicker than does a military’s
clock. Military commanders tend to press for more time, while societies
and political leaders urge the military to conclude military activity, as
recent U.S. political-military discussions on Syria illustrate.30 In proxy
environments, military commanders need to appreciate that they must
balance the time on all these clocks.
More importantly, leaders in proxy environments must focus on the the
social and political appetites of their proxy because as Thucydides reminds
the student of war, actors wage war out of fear, honor, or self-interest.31
When the proxy aligned with the principal—because its interests have
shifted, it no longer feels threatened or dishonored to the degree that its
needs external support—it will seek to distance itself from the principal.
However, failure to see that and accept that these relationships, by their
transactional or exploitative character, have a finite duration can result in
the principal-agent relationship turning foul. See Figure 1, Time’s Effect on
Proxy Relationships. The May 2018 national elections in Iraq provide an
instructive example of this argument.
Figure 1: Time's Effect on Proxy Relationships

Source: Author.
The success of Shia nationalist, Muqtada al-Sadr, at the expense of Prime
Minister Abadi, in Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary elections is perhaps
representative of the role time plays in proxy environments. Prior to the
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election Abadi led the defeat of the Islamic State, stymied Kurdish
independence, and held the country together when it was teetering on
collapse. However, Abadi and his government were unable to force the
United States to reduce its presence in the country following that series of
success. Causality being difficult to discern, the Iraqi electorate turned out
to support Sadr’s pro-Iraqi, Shia nationalist platform in the election,
resulting with Abadi and his bloc coming in third place.32 The strategic
effect of the election is still unclear, but it is decidedly easy to forecast a
dramatic change in the relationship between the two countries.33

The Limited Liability Fallacy and the Increasing Use of the
Siege
Another misconception about proxy warfare is that it is an economy of
force mission that results in a limited liability approach to warfare. Votel
and Keravouri articulate as much in stating, “By, with, and through is a
way of conducting military activities and operations with less direct
combat employment of U.S. forces.”34 While the economy of force is true
to varying degrees, the limited liability aspect is short-sided and
disingenuous.
Modern proxy conflict is dominated by death and destruction; however, it
just so happens that the death and destruction affect the proxy to almost
an equal degree as that of the enemy. More to the point, in recent year’s
proxy warfare has resulted a drastic increase in the number, duration, and
lethality of sieges across the globe.35 Sieges, like those in Mosul and
Marawi, from an American perspective, or Donetsk airport and
Debal’tseve from a Russian perspective, illustrate the close bond between
fighting through proxies and the increased risk for the principal’s proxy.
The resultant effect is that the character of proxy warfare increases the
cost and risk for the proxy force and its government, therefore creating the
conditions that can accelerate divergence in the relationship between the
partners.

The Principal-Agent Problem: The Root of Transactional and
Exploitative Relationships
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The principal-agent problem is essential in proxy environments.
Organizational theorist, Kathleen Eisenhardt, argues that principal-agent
problems arise in situations “In which one party (the principal) delegates
work to another (the agent) who performs that work.”36 Further,
Eisenhardt states that two primary problems arise in this dynamic – 1) the
problem of agency and 2) the problem of risk sharing.37 Eisenhardt defines
the agency problem as a situation that occurs when, “The desires or goals
of the principal and agent conflict,” while she defines the problem of risk
sharing as a situation that arises when the principal and agent possess
dissimilar prerogatives towards risk, resulting in divergent action as
contact with risk continues.38 However, the problem of agency and risk
sharing is not new. Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz highlighted this
concept two hundred years ago in writing that, “One country may support
another’s cause, but will never take it as serious as it takes its own.”39
The American military tends to see the proxy, or agent, possessing
limitless will to work with its forces. In most cases, it fails to see that
cooperation is fleeting because as the agent becomes more capable or as
other actors are able to identify vulnerabilities and manipulate those to
their own end, the agent becomes gradually less interested in working with
the principal. To put it differently, as time progresses and objectives are
accomplished, each parties’ self-interest begins to supplant the objectives
and end states that brought the principal and agent together in the first
place. See Figure 2, Principal-Agent Problem. Operation Inherent Resolve
provides an instructive model in support of the principal-agent problem.
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Figure 2: Principal-Agent Problems

Source: Author
Following Operation Inherent Resolve’s devastating battle of Mosul, a
several tactical objectives remained. These objectives included defeating
residual Islamic State forces in Tal A’far, Hawijah, and along Iraq’s
Euphrates River Valley, from Fallujah to the Syrian border.40 Given the
2,000 Islamic State fighters estimated to be in Tal A’far, the battle of
Mosul’s savagery and devastation served as the template for the remaining
battles.41
The Iraqi Security Forces (the agent) and the American-led coalition (the
principal) commenced hostilities against the Islamic State in Tal A’far on
August 19, 2017, but Islamic State resistance did not fully materialize and
the battle ended within eight days.42 Casualties on both sides were
relatively low, especially when contrasted with those from Mosul. Prime
Minister Abadi, as well as many leaders within the Iraqi Security Forces,
appeared to have taken two major points from this time. First, the battle of
Mosul had a decisive effect on the Islamic State. The organization’s
military wing within Iraq was physically defeated, leaving little force for
the Islamic State’s political wing to continue large-scale combat
operations.
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Two, Mosul had hardened the Iraqi Security Forces and increased its
steadfastness. These two effects resulted in the government of Iraq and the
Iraqi Security Forces (the agent) losing interest in maintaining pressure on
the Islamic State. In effect, the success of Mosul and Tal A’Far accelerated
the divergence between raison d’être and the agent’s self-interest.
With the threat of the Islamic State marginalized, and the Iraqi Security
Forces self-confident, the government of Iraq reoriented on the Kurds. In
September 2017, Iraqi Kurdistan, led by Marzoud Barzani, voted for
independence from Iraq. Prime Minister Abadi, unwilling to accept
Kurdish independence, launched an offensive in mid-October 2017 to
thwart the movement.43 Sidestepping his coalition partners, Abadi’s
Kurdish operation was unilateral and a clear signal of divergence between
the principal and the agent in Iraq.
In Syria, another example of the principal-agent problem exists, although
this one finds the United States as the principal and the Kurdishdominated Syrian Democratic Forces as the agent. Turkey, upset with
growing Kurdish strength in Syria, accelerated pressure on the Syrian
Kurds by attacking Kurdish territory along the Turkey-Syria border. This
weakened the strategic bond between the principal (the United States) and
the agent (the Syrian Democratic Forces) because the risk to the Kurdish
people in northern Syria and the loss of their traditional territory was of
higher concern to the Syrian Kurds than maintaining pressure on the
Islamic State in Syria’s eastern desert. As a result, the Syrian Democratic
Forces temporarily broke contact with the American-led coalition to
defend its people and territory in Afrin and other areas of northern Syria,
which drove a two-month operational pause in the counter-Islamic State
mission in Syria during the spring of 2018.44 A similar situation occurred
in the fall of 2018, resulting in another operational pause in the campaign
to defeat the Islamic State in Syria.45
Operation Inherent Resolve provides two examples of the principal-agent
problem, but the problem exists anywhere proxy warfare is conducted. As
long as one actor seeks to work through another actor, problems of agency
and risk will always exist. The components of proxy environments
described above form the basis for understanding two theoretical models
of proxy warfare: The Exploitative Model and the Transactional Model.
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The Role of Power in Proxy Warfare
Power—its principles, components, and influence—lies just below time
and principal-agent problems in understanding proxy warfare. Historian
Sir Michael Howard offers that, “Power, to the statesman, is…that capacity
to control their environment on which the independent existence of their
states and often the cultural values of their societies depend.”46 Moving to
a more practical level, political scientist Robert Dahl, provides a useful
model for understanding the discreteness of power.
Robert Dahl argues that power exists in a relationship between two or
more actors; that, “A has power over B to the extent the he can get B to do
something that B would not otherwise do.”47 Dahl continues, stating that
power is not self-perpetuating, but that in most cases it has a base. The
base of power consists of all the resources from which an actor draws to
affect the behavior of another actor. Dahl posits that the base of power is a
similar to potential energy in that it requires activation to generate its
desired effect. Dahl states thatto manipulatingone’s base of power
effectively is the primary means for maintaining power over another
actor.48 Dahl notes that a delay exists between A’s exertion of power and
B’s ability to react. This delay, which Dahl refers to as “lag,” represents the
processing and action time associated with A’s power and B’s ability and
willingness to be overpowered.49 Lag influences proxy environments
because if often hides or distorts an actor’s true intention. This creates
dissonance for actors, across the levels of war, as they attempt to maintain
power and influence within their relationship. See Figure 3: Graphical
Representation of Lag.

Figure 3: Graphical Representation of Lag
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Source: Author
Equally important, Dahl argues that a relationship between two actors
must exist, otherwise there is no vehicle to enact power.50 See Figure 4:
Wave of Influence in Proxy Relationships.
Figure 4: Wave of Influence in Proxy Relationships

Source: Author
These relationships are not static but morph as conditions change, time
passes, and other actors enter or depart a given situation. This idea, that
associations change, thus increasing or decreasing one’s relative power, is
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a central tenet in proxy warfare. However, this idea is often overlooked in
applied relationships—when A, guided by its own interests, attempts to
maintain power and influence over B—like those found in proxy wars. See
Figure 5: Wave of Influence in Adversarial Context.
Figure 5: Wave of Influence in an Adversarial Context

Source: Author
Tying Dahl’s theory of power to the principal-agent problem, one can
argue that Dahl’s A equates to the principal, while B is the agent.
Therefore, the principal possesses power of the proxy, or agent, insofar as
it can make it do something it would not otherwise do. Dahl’s principles of
power forms the basis for understanding two theoretical models of proxy
warfare—the Exploitative Model and the Transactional Model.

Theories of Proxy Warfare
61
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss1/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.1.1701

Fox: Conflict and the Need for a Theory of Proxy Warfare

Theories serve to set the course for doctrine. Harkening back to
Clausewitz, we find that,
The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas
that have become, as it were, confused and entangled. Not until
terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make any
progress in examining the question clearly and simply and expect
the read to share one’s view.51
In the spirit of Clausewitz’s musing, and viewed in relation to components
of proxy environments depicted above, two models of proxy warfare come
to the fore. These models represent the idea of ‘varying degrees of proxy
warfare’ in a tangible way that makes the idea useful for the practitioner of
war.

The Exploitative Model: Principal Leads, Agent Follows
Two similar, yet distinct models characterize proxy environments: The
Exploitative Model and the Transactional Model. From the outside, these
models look quite similar, but their inner-workings differ. A proxy force
being completely dependent on its principal for survival characterizes the
Exploitative Model; the relationship could almost be viewed as one
between a parasite and a host. The principal provides the lifeblood for the
parasitic proxy to survive. This dependency creates a strong bond between
the proxy and the partner, resulting in the partner possessing almost
unlimited power and influence over the proxy.
Further, the Exploitative Model is usually the result of a stronger actor
looking for a tool—a proxy force—to pursue an objective. As a result, the
proxy is only as useful to the principal as is its ability to make progress
towards the principal’s ends. This results in a temporal relationship
between the principal and the agent. Once the principal’s ends have been
achieved, or the proxy is unable to maintain momentum towards the
principal’s ends then the principal discontinues the relationship or
distances itself from the proxy. See Figure 6, The Exploitative Model of
Proxy Warfare.
Figure 6: The Exploitative Model of Proxy Warfare
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Source: Author
Europe provides one of the best contemporary examples of this model,
embodied in the relationship between Russia and the separatists in
Ukraine’s Donbas region. The existence of the Russian-leaning separatists,
the funding and materiel backing of its army, and its pseudo-political
status are all Russian foundations.
The Middle East also provides several examples of the Exploitative Model.
Perhaps the two most noticeable examples are the U.S. military’s ongoing
relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Iraqi Security
Forces throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Syrian Democratic
Forces are a creation of the United States military and their status as an
American partner will likely only last as long as they are able to maintain
pressure on the Islamic State in Syria. Similarly, the Iraqi Security Forces,
rebuilt from the ashes of Saddam Hussein’s army after Paul Bremer’s
dismissal of the Iraqi Army in May 2003, was the United States’
intermediary in combating al Qaeda, Shia militia groups, Iranian proxies,
and other adversaries in Iraq until policy changes formally ended the
principal-agent relationship in December 2011.
In each case, the agent is vitally dependent on its principal. However,
success can cause the power relationship to change between the partners.
A successful proxy force can generate enough legitimacy or support that it
grows powerful enough to need backing from its partner. Similarly, the
political apparatus the proxy supports can gain sufficient power and
legitimacy that it elects to no longer serve as an agent, as the Iraqi Security
Forces’ independence following the United States’ departure in December
2011 highlights. See Figure 7, Proxy Success and the Evolution of
Partnered Relationships. If, through battlefield success, political
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wrangling, or other actors seeking to undermine the existing principal, the
proxy can also find itself in the second model, the Transactional Model.
Figure 7: Proxy Success and the Evolution of Partnered
Relationships

Source: Author
The Transactional Model: Agent Leads, Principal Follows
The Transactional Model is proxy warfare’s second model. Again,
Clausewitz provides the foundation for understanding this model, as he
writes, “But even when both states are in earnest about making war upon
the third, they do not always say, “we must treat this country as our
common enemy and destroy it, or we shall be destroyed ourselves.” Far
from it: The affair is more often like a business deal.”52 The point being
that an exchange of services and goods that benefits all parties—defeat of a
mutual threat, training of the agent’s force, foreign military sales and
finance—is at the heart of the Transactional Model. See Figure 8, The
Transactional Model of Proxy Warfare.
Figure 8: The Transactional Model of Proxy Warfare
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Source: Author
Yet, this model is a paradox because the proxy is the powerbroker in the
relationship. In many cases, the proxy government is independent but
looking for assistance in defeating an adversary; it is not interested in
political or military subjugation by the principal. Moreover, the proxy
possesses the power in the relationship because its association with the
principal is wholly transactional. Given the transactional character of the
relationship, the clock starts ticking on the duration of the bond when the
first shot fired. . As a result, the agent’s interest in the principal recedes at
a comparable rate to the attainment of the two actors’ common goal. The
government of Iraq’s 2014 request for American and coalition assistance
to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq is an example of this dynamic.
A mental picture to support this model is to view the proxy in the lead,
while the partner follows and supports the proxy. Unlike the Exploitative
Model, this model sees the proxy force’s government request support from
other nation(s) to defeat a given threat. In doing so, the proxy force’s
government places parameters on the partner, to include such things as
force caps, a unambiguous mission, and time lines. The proxy issues
parameters to align the principal with its own political and military
objectives. Additionally, the proxy constrains the principal in order to limit
the ability to influence the proxy beyond the defined parameters of the
affiliation. It is also important to note the fact that the proxy has fixed
political and social interest in the principal; it is likely that the proxy will
look to end its dependency on the principal upon the attainment of its
goals.
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At the same time, the Transactional Model is extremely vulnerable to
external influence. The Transactional Model is vulnerable because the
proxy’s commitment to the principal is based self-interest more than
survival, meaning it can divorce itself from the principal whenever it no
longer profits from the relationship. This provides advantage for adroit
actors seeking to drive a wedge into a principal-agent relationship. Russia
and China’s activity in Iraq provides an instructive example of this
dynamic. See Figure 6, Wave of Influence in an Adversarial Context.
Seeking to weaken the America-Iraqi bond, both have managed to wedge
themselves into the foreign military sales and foreign military finance
realm, which was the bulwark of American political and military strategy
in Iraq.53 In doing so, both Russia and China have managed to gain
strategic access, influence, and tactical in-roads across the country.
Similarly, clever external actors will undercut the principal by providing
support with fewer caveats on the support they provide the agent in order
to exploit gaps in the principal’s policy and relationship strategy, and thus
cleave away the principal.
It is critical to understand the model in which one is operating. Hubris,
inattentiveness, or naivety in the Transactional Model can result in the
decoupling of the principal and the agent. An assessments program and an
exit plan are important when operating within the Transactional Model.
The assessments program allows the principal to see itself in relation to its
agent and determine where it sits in relation to the culmination point of its
relationship with the agent. The exit plan is simply that – the plan to
conclude the relationship and move forward on favorable terms. Failure to
have an assessment program and exit plan can result in the agent bilking
the principal, or the principal ruining the long-term political relationship
between the two. This exploitation can come in the form of requests for
monetary assistance, feigning bureaucratic incompetence to outsource its
bureaucratic requirements to the principal, and a number of other ways.

Conclusion
The point of this essay has been to provide a professional critique against
the argument for the utility of the ‘by, with, and through’ approach. This
essay has argued that the ‘by, with, and through’ approach has yielded
limited tactical and operational success, but it has not generated tangible
strategic victory in any of the recent conflicts. Further, and more
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importantly, the ‘by, with, and through’ approach is a euphemism for
proxy warfare. By speaking euphemistically about proxy environments, the
United States military undercuts its own understanding of how to succeed
in those environments. As such, the United States military and the defense
industry must change its attitude towards proxy warfare and speak openly
about those types of conflict. Doing so will generate improved results as
leaders at all levels better understand the linkage between tactical action
and political objectives, but also, the paradoxes that dominate proxy
environments.
Moreover, commonalities dominate proxy environments. These
commonalities enable the student of war to frame proxy environments.
These commonalities result in a series of axioms that bracket proxy
warfare. Principal-agent problems, the limited liability fallacy, and the
domineering character of time command proxy environments. These
characteristics result in two models of proxy warfare, the Exploitative
Model and the Transactional Model. These models yield a handful of
principles of proxy warfare, which viewed in conjunction with the models
of proxy warfare, should serve as the basis for a proxy warfare doctrine.
A number of proxy warfare principles emerge from the discussion thus far.
These principles, while not all-inclusive, should serve as the starting point
for articulating a universal proxy warfare doctrine. The proposed
principles of proxy warfare are:
•
•
•

•

•
•

Principals, agents, and actors will act in a manner aligned with their
respective political objectives;
Proxy relationships will expire; therefore, it is important to identify
one’s own termination criteria and transition plan;
Because of the lag between the tactical level and higher echelons,
one should take tactical feedback as not wholly representative of
operational, strategic, and political direction;
A principal’s continued presence beyond the end of the principalagent relationship can cause the agent’s political, social, and
military entities to turn against its former partner;
It is better to face one opponent than it is two; therefore, opponents
will attempt to dislocate principal-agent relationships;
Savvy opponents will seek to fracture the principal-agent alliance
by:
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•

o attacking the relationships bonding or
o introducing existential threats that challenge that livelihood
of one the partners
Due to the lag in tactical feedback, red teaming and assessments are
critical to monitoring a principal-agent dynamic.54

These principles, plus the Exploitative and Transactional Models of proxy
warfare, provides a starting point for t to begin constructing a
comprehensive proxy warfare doctrine. This approach, embracing proxy
warfare, and moving beyond modern narratives, like that of the ‘by, with,
and through’ approach are warranted given the lack of qualitative and
quantitative results in the United States’ recent proxy wars.
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